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French Feminism vs
Anglo-American Feminism:
A Reconstruction
Sylvie A. Gambaudo
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM
ABSTRACT This article opens with the questioning of a now established scholarly
category, ‘French feminism’. It proposes that theoretical and polemical understand-
ings of ‘French feminism’ have been founded on an opposition to its counterpart,
‘Anglo-American feminism’. The measure of this opposition has been defined
mostly as geographical, linguistic and cultural. But underneath such constructions
often lies the old sameness vs difference debate that has captivated feminism since
the suffragettes. The article argues for a less oppositional and less discounting defi-
nition of the two strands of feminism. It proposes to read oppositional classifications
as motivation for a dialogue addressed to the ‘other’ of theoretical constructs; ques-
tioning the likelihood of foregoing oppositional classification.
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(otherness) 
Is there such a thing as ‘French feminism’? Judging by the growing number
of texts using the term, undoubtedly ‘French feminism’ has entered the
annals of scholastic terminology. It has become a self-explanatory expres-
sion that the sentient recognize as a coded referent, signalling the users’
inclusion in a certain way of thinking. It signals belonging and it signals an
existing intellectual tradition. To conceive of French feminism as a ‘tradi-
tion’ implies that the term has gained momentum and recognition. Yet, this
is far from a true representation if we consider the vehement and fertile
exchanges that have gathered and opposed the so-called French feminists
and their critics. A taster of such exchanges could go as follows. The French
feminists’ ‘woman’, excluded from masculine discourse, is at best the other
of man’s symbols. A nothing or a mystic figure, her language defies com-
prehension, and confirms her as the marginal and impotent of discourse.
Decidedly of western extraction, the French feminist ‘woman’ is locked in
an either/or of ‘the idealistic tendency of structuralist thought [ignoring]
the historical/social specificity of language structures’ (Nye, 1986: 51).
The Anglo-American feminists’ views on ‘woman’ are equally damning.
Founded upon ‘the American interest in the self; the British emphasis on
class . . . puritanical and work-oriented’ (Stanford-Friedman, 1993: 249), the
Anglo-American feminist ‘woman’ lacks originality. Her structure occa-
sionally chimes with phallocentric and her style conveys a sense of deja vu.
But, leaving the sometimes acerbic arguments on the back-seat, both sides
agree on one thing: French feminism is not the sum of its parts, it is not
French and it is not feminism. Yet, the term sticks above such terms as ‘third
wave feminism’, ‘post-feminism’, ‘post-structuralist feminist literary the-
ory’, etc. Even if they are not entirely equivalent, these terms are often inter-
changeable as they point to a different theoretical emphasis on something
post, something past, something that comes after. After what? After the
hard-core ideals of the feminist struggle. We would be dealing with the
aftermath of feminism because, some believe, feminism is dead, feminism
has reached its end and achieved its objectives. And yet, with front-page
headlines such as ‘Women now paid 30 percent less. Scandal as pay gap
with men reaches a record 25-year high’ (Daily Express, 1 June 2004), it does
not take much ingenuity to perceive that even very early feminist equal
opportunity objectives, which, by virtue of being quantifiable, may appear
less complicated to carry through, are far from having been achieved.
Moreover, with captions asking readers to phone-vote on ‘Should women
get same pay as men?’ (Daily Express, 1 June 2004: 12), it appears that the
very spirit of equal opportunity, elicited by suffragettes from the mid-1860s
onwards, has still not been assimilated by some of our 21st-century con-
stituents. So, while some claim feminism is passé, unsurprisingly, others
claim feminism has failed to deliver the promised post-patriarchal land it
announced. To evaluate such a bleak prognosis in such a short space would
not do justice to the extraordinary revolution that feminism has been and
still is. As a starting point, I now emphasize one aspect of feminist history
(the sameness and difference debate) that strikes me as significant in under-
standing French feminist thought.
The first two waves of the feminist struggle are historically typified first
by a call for the equal treatment of women with regards to civic and social
rights and second by the recognition of women’s right to difference. In the
first instance, the claim to equality was founded upon a logic of sameness
whereby since women are as rational as men, society carries a duty to give
its female citizens equal opportunity to take part in social organization:
education, suffrage, etc. Early feminists thus elicited the debate ‘equality
vs difference’ that would from then on be at the core of feminist debates.
Early views centred round the assimilation of woman to man, effectively
encouraging woman to become like man in character (rational, proactive,
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responsible, etc.) while otherwise retaining her femininity (caring, maternal,
supportive, etc.). But the assimilation of woman to man and the sub-
servience of her feminine condition to the advancement of man soon
became the target of criticism for a second wave of feminists who, thanks
to the hard work of early feminists, were now educated, better repre-
sented in the workplace, in the political arena, etc. – in a word equipped
to challenge the ideology of patriarchal organization.
Second-wave feminists rejected early feminists’ bid for equality on the
ground that equality effectively encouraged women to see themselves
with a man’s eyes. Equality could be gained on the condition that woman
be gauged by the same criteria that defined man. In short, equal to man
meant same as man. Outside this model, women were still denied visibil-
ity and recognition. Second-wave feminists defied the patriarchal status
quo by declaring woman different. Different from what? Different from
the woman she was as the counterpart of man, with different needs, dif-
ferent sensitivity, different modes of expression, etc. than those man had
defined for her. These feminists efficiently theorized woman’s situation.
They proved that woman was used as the invisible thread that keeps
the patriarchal social fabric together, and that this position was far from
gratifying, let alone fulfilling her (Kate Millett, Betty Friedan, Germaine
Greer, for instance). Discontented with such misrepresentation and mis-
treatment, woman would, from then on, do her own defining. To this
effect, second-wave feminists used radical measures (hence ‘radical femi-
nism’) and did a spectacular job in pulling this different woman out of her
closet by giving her difference substance. A distinctly female authorship
was salvaged from the scraps of mainstream literature and promoted as
part of a historicizing of women’s literary achievement (for instance,
Virago Press). Women authors wrote more systematically about women’s
experience, making audible a consciousness that had previously been
kept silent. The English language, construed as a man-made language
(Dale Spender, 1980), became a terrain of investigation of women’s
oppression and some (Suzette Haden-Elgin) suggested that the creation of
a language to accommodate specific female experience would change
women’s lives (this idea survives in policies of political correctness).
However, as radical feminism progressed, so did the formalization of
the difference debate, pitching opposing theoretical factions against each
other. Disputes among feminists show that although the move to promot-
ing women’s difference was animated by a genuine desire to create a sis-
terhood where women might find legitimacy, this sisterhood was itself
struggling to unify the desires of all its members. Initially steered by
white, middle-class, heterosexual women, issues of class, race, sexuality,
etc. divided the movement and subgroups emerged to account for those
differences, for instance black feminism, lesbian feminism, etc. These sub-
groups testified to the dissatisfaction with the assimilation of woman to
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her ‘difference’ because assimilation also homogenized all women to a
‘sameness in difference’. Hence, the initial dissatisfaction with the assim-
ilation of woman to the dominant discourse and with her subservience to
the advancement of that dominant group was disappointingly repeated
within the movement.
The argument for the failure or even end of feminism usually refers
to this turbulent time of internal disagreements. Yet, the issue of sameness/
difference, far from being dead or passé, would go through further theo-
retical phases where men and women would be scrutinized for biological,
psychological, behavioural, environmental similarities and differences
that would justify (or refute), explain (or confuse), the existence of the cat-
egories man and woman. As the formalization of the sameness/difference
continued, so new schools of feminist thought were created. It is a tribute
to the movement that the division of opinion and the splintering of ‘fem-
inism’ into what could be called feminist ‘specialism’ has not translated
into the demise of feminism but its transformation and diversification.
However, the increased formalization and specialization of feminist
thought has also intellectualized the debate and made its former
bra-burning, slogan-brandishing presence less pronounced. In a culture
where visibility often rhymes with media spectacle, the perception that
feminism is passé is also to be attributed to its discretion. Finally, it seems
to me that the perception that militant feminism has ‘disappeared’ from
the social arena is due to the redistribution of many of its causes in non-
feminist identified areas of social reform. Equal opportunity, political
correctness, diversity awareness, parity, etc. are today’s catch-phrases that
hide behind them the continuation of contemporary feminist militantism.
Third-wave feminism takes its place in this context of increased intel-
lectualization of the debate. The debate over sameness/difference has
moved away from confrontational means of gaining social reform and
towards a more academic style. Third-wave feminists are invested in
articulating theories explaining why, in spite of the work done, the debate
persists and how to transcend it.
Alice Jardine (1982) and Toril Moi (1988) are largely responsible for the
use of the term ‘French feminism’, the one for the coining of the term and
the other for further limiting its use to a few selected authors. In her
famous article, ‘Gynesis’, Jardine detected the emergence of French femi-
nist thought out of the intellectual scene of 1980s France. Characterized
by the dawn of what has been termed ‘modernity’ or ‘postmodernism’,
French theorists were invested in theorizing the failure of the modernist
project and moving its failed dialectic towards new theoretical horizons. For
the feminist project, this translated in revisiting the debate over sameness
and difference. As for Toril Moi, the publication of her Sexual/Textual
Politics in 1985 made official a division between Anglo-American feminists
and French feminists. Anglo-American feminists (Kate Millett, Virginia
Woolf, Elaine Showalter) would be invested in seeking a woman-centred
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perspective and in defining a woman identity they believe women have
been denied. French feminists (Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Julia
Kristeva), on the other hand, would be indebted to Simone de Beauvoir
and would believe that woman does not have an identity as such but that
the feminine can be identified where difference and otherness are found.
Today, the term French feminism is commonly used in Anglo-American lit-
erary circles. It is this packaging of the adoption of the term ‘French femi-
nism’ and how it contributes to the sameness/difference debate that this
article now addresses.
Most researchers (Delphy, Lechte, Smith, Moi, etc.) concur on the idea
that French feminism is an Anglo-American invention. They argue that its
purpose is to commodify, behind the qualifier ‘French’, this evanescent
part of continental thought for domestic consumption.
Geographical fencing off (identifying separate French and Anglo-
American feminisms) would be a metaphorical fencing off of two distinct
ideologies. On the one hand, Anglo-American feminism denotes a geo-
graphical limit. More than this, ‘Anglo-American’ pertains to a linguistic
tradition that does not seem to concern ‘French’. The US and the UK
share, since the Reagan/Thatcher years, this ‘special relationship’ that
transcends a mere common language. ‘French’ thought, on the other
hand, does not necessarily include French-speaking countries other than
France and certainly does not imply the grouping of two or more national
territories according to linguistic and political privileging. A famous
example is found in Moi, who defines as the ‘Holy trinity’ of French femi-
nist theory three women (Irigaray, Kristeva, Cixous) who are respectively
Belgian, Bulgarian and French pied noir. If French feminism does not nec-
essarily include French natives, it does include thinkers of a common intel-
lectual tradition. But this common intellectual tradition is defined from
without. French feminism is ‘a body of comments by Anglo-American
writers on a selection of French and non-French writers: Lacan, Freud,
Kristeva, Cixous, Derrida and Irigaray are the core groups. But there are
others’ (Delphy, 2000: 172). Though not all of them French, and leaving
Freud aside for now, they do have in common the French language as
their elected mode of expression. This may not simply be intellectual arro-
gance, reserving French thought for the conversants into the riddles of the
continental post-structuralist linguistic games. Kristeva expressed this
clearly when she stated that ‘Foreigners must confront a ghost from the
past that remains hidden in a secret part of themselves’ (Guberman, 1996:
4). In choosing to express themselves in a foreign language, these theorists
are also giving themselves a tool to tap into archaic contents of the sub-
ject’s being.
Kristeva also stresses that we all carry memories of childhood connected
with places, their colours, smells and sounds, and that the reason for which
these recollections are often hazy is that we find it difficult to express them
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in words: as adults, we have lost touch with the language of childhood. A
foreign language can help us translate those early impressions of the world
into words because it is more distanced from them than our mother tongue
is. It is for this reason that Kristeva found her analysis, which was con-
ducted in French, helpful in transposing her images of childhood onto her
new culture. (Cavallero, 2003: 144–5)
Indeed, the distance French provides to these ‘foreign’ French feminists
enables them to deal with and represent pre-oedipal contents. But protec-
tion through linguistic distancing is not the sole motivation for gathering
around the French language. Connections between the language and other
issues like translation, otherness and oppression are embedded in the lan-
guage. ‘Foreign’ French feminists and Anglo-American critics’ absorption
in French bears significance even more visibly when their choice to read or
speak French is not the fortuitous consequence of having been brought up
into a language. It is interesting to pause on the history of the French lan-
guage and specifically on its long-lived association with power struggles,
won and lost. I am not suggesting that such an association is the appanage
of French since linguistic imperialism has long been a recognized weapon
of colonization and submission of the one culture by the other. But I am
emphasizing the fact that France and the French language have a long his-
tory as linguistic oppressor and oppressed and that this implicit history is
also part of the lure to French of a certain intellectual practice.
The use of the French language was first made compulsory by Hugues
Capet (10th century) as part of the government’s effort to absorb southern
provinces to the Duchy of Paris. The langue d’oïl, the dialect of Paris then
became the official language, effectively causing the demise of languages
spoken south of the Loire river until their revival in the mid-19th century
in an attempt to assert a regional Occitan identity (Provençal, Catalan, for
instance). While ‘minor’ languages have been restored, the government is
at the same time fighting for the survival of the French language in
France, in a globalizing context where linguistic supremacy is driven by
the market economy. I am thinking of the Toubon Law for instance, which
imposes the compulsory but not exclusive use of French on certain docu-
ments (consumer goods, instruction manuals, advertisements). The Body
Shop was famously the first company to be fined in 1996 for failing to
comply with the Toubon linguistic rule. So the French language has his-
torically oscillated between weapon and recipient of linguistic oppres-
sion. We may further hypothesize that more recent sociopolitical events
help explain why the French linguistic context may be prosperous to a
certain type of thought.
French has become one of the languages to express ideas of difference par
excellence. The claim for France’s position as the champion of ‘difference’
was initiated under the Mitterrand government. But the idea arches
back to the French Revolution. The year 1789 is seen as the turning point,
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when a change of focus is observed in philosophy, literature, politics, etc.
Eighteenth-century values had failed to bring social happiness and ended
in bloodshed. Social and political unrest, rapid technological advances,
the rejection of rationality in favour of emotions, etc., translated in a move
away from collective concerns to that of the individual and his/her singu-
larity. Hence, the use of French as the language of predilection by theorists
of French thought (not necessarily French themselves) is no coincidence.
If France sponsors a tradition of difference, the clash between French
and Anglo-American thinkers is not surprising. Could the use of the
French language also be a defensive linguistic response against the feared
American linguistic imperialism trading even closer by virtue of the
British alliance with the cultural giant? If there is a withering away of
language, as Kristeva proposed, and of the French language and culture
in particular, one response ‘consists in turning back toward tradition in
a loving, proud, reactive, nostalgic fashion’ (Guberman, 1996: 169).
Another, as I explained elsewhere,1 privileges the subversion of text over
protectionist measures. French feminism, feminism in French then, is a
reactive and subversive response. French feminist strategy is not as apol-
itical as many Anglo-American feminists would have it. Its sociopolitical
engagement can be extrapolated from this: the use of a receding language
is the means by which French feminists destabilize, escape the grip
of dominant ideology and ultimately coerce this dominant ideology to
reckon with issues of marginalization. The irritation of Anglo-American
feminists is understandable. But in the battle for linguistic authority, so is
the irritation of French feminists at the Anglo-American label. For reactive
and subversive strategies go beyond a mere attack on geographical and
linguistic imperialism. Issues of national or linguistic dominance should
be read as the symptom of a much wider problematic that interests French
feminists: that of representation, or more precisely, re-presentation as the
secondary presentation of a primary process. This leads us to the issue of
translation and we can now return to the place given to Freud in French
feminist theory and make a few remarks on his contribution.
Freud’s position has prime significance in the context of French femi-
nism and pre-oedipality. Freud historically precedes all other French
feminist thinkers. Freud acts as a referent. Freud is the link to a shared fas-
cination for a certain conception of consciousness that can be traced back
to his tradition. French feminism is also post-Freudian feminism. The
Anglo-American readership of a post-Millettian persuasion is undoubt-
edly suspicious if not averse to such acceptance of the paternalist enemy.2
This is in some ways justified, but also partly a misreading of those
French feminists. In theorizing representation of the individual, French
feminist thinkers have in common their interest in pre-oedipality.
Representation of the maternal experience typifies French feminism. It
also draws them apart. From the search for a specifically feminine mode
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of representation to the protective holding on to the symbolic as the ticket
to safety, French feminist narratives tell of a questioning addressed to the
paternal and to the maternal. From subversive to reactive then, French
feminist representation oscillates between dissidence from and compli-
ance with the patriarchal letter.
To the dismay of Anglo-American feminists, dissidence is not spelt out in
the narrative. Dissidence is in the confusion and ambiguity of expression
and must be extrapolated. We are in the grips of translation on several lev-
els. First, to express oneself in a foreign language in to speak another lan-
guage. The leap from foreign languages as the language of the others, to
foreign language as the language of foreignness or otherness is easily made.
Hence, a first meaning of translation is found in this Freudian reading: leap
from other to proper self, from pre-oedipal to symbolic, from maternal to
paternal, etc. Second, the confusion or ambiguity present in the French text
leaves the English translator with the ungrateful task of making choices: fix-
ing the other, the pre-oedipal, the maternal with linguistic symbols (inter-
preting while translating); translating the ambiguity with the use of slash
symbols (for example féminin becomes feminine/female); rewriting the text in
English and using the ambiguity of the English language to make a point
(Nicole Ward-Jouve does this, for instance).
That translation dissolves, alters and reforms meanings is nothing new.
But the agency of translation (or of the translator) perhaps has not been
emphasized enough. ‘One cannot ignore issues of translation and cultural
difference in the representation of a writer’s thought’, Smith (1998: 5)
exclaims. Indeed, translation demands that we address these two aspects
of its practice. French feminists are attached to the French language as the
privileged space where they construct meaning. This is significant, as we
have seen earlier. English translators distort that construction and, with or
without their approval, impose an Anglo-American identity upon French
feminists. There is a tendency to assume the equivalence of the French
and English languages, equalling their differences to a kind of transcen-
dental reality of meaning, a transcendence both languages would be sub-
ject to. At times, this has led to aberrant interpretations founded, not so
much on a poignant analysis of text, but on the indiscriminate analysis of
the translated text. I am regularly reminded of this difficulty when per-
plexed students attempt the perilous task of making sense of ‘the femi-
nine’. There is feminine (a sociopolitical reality) and there is feminine (a
positioning of identity). In fact, both meanings are diametrically opposed.
From a feminist perspective, the sociopolitical feminine is on the side of
patriarchal representation of ‘woman’ while the ‘positioned’ feminine is
on the side of the non-verbal, or the transverbal, if we are lucky. In Lacan’s
infamous ‘woman is not’, the metaphoric woman is in the void, absence,
invisibility, the in-between of language. The sexism of such a remark is
not in the suggestion that under patriarchal analogy women do not exist
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symbolically but in arresting thought at that. Luckily, authors like Cixous
rescue the Lacanian sentence by showing the possibility to create those
in-betweens as literary practice. Although woman is still absent or invisible,
she is now intentionally created. So language, once decried as ‘man-made’
(Spender) can now be effected, against Lacan, to ‘make woman’.
The difficulty with such a practice is to work on two opposite registers
at once. When Hélène Cixous writes of écriture féminine or of the other
bisexuality, she works on two levels: a literal level and a metaphorical
level. Susan Sellers sums it up: ‘we all continually fluctuate between gen-
der roles, sometimes assuming defensive, “masculine” positions, at other
times willing to risk prohibition, and at other times combining elements
of each’ (Sellers, 1994: xxviii). Yet, Sellers’ statement is still too organized,
too phallogocentric, too much of a remark founded on the differentiation
of meaning whereby, although we are offered three terms, one is either
masculine or feminine or a combination. Cixous’ expression is an either/
or and all of those at once. It expresses at the same time meaning as the
outcome of differentiation and meaning as ‘the non-exclusion of differ-
ence’ (Cixous, cited in Sellers, 1994: 41). Freud taught us that difference is
founded on exclusion and that the excluded must be the mother. Cixous
emphasizes another difference, difference without exclusion, difference
before exclusion:
I will never say often enough that the difference is not one, that there is
never one without the other, and that the charm of difference (beginning
with sexual difference) is that it passes. It crosses through us, like a goddess.
We cannot capture it. It makes us teeter with emotion. It is in this living agi-
tation that there is always room for you in me, your presence and your
place. I is never an individual. I is haunted. I is always. Before knowing any-
thing, an I-love-you. (Cixous, cited in Sellers, 1994: xviii)
The other bisexuality is both the reunion after castration of the two
halves elicited by Ovid3 and ‘the location within oneself of the presence of
both sexes’ (Cixous, cited in Sellers, 1994: 41) before sexual difference,
before the knowledge that one can be cut. So, écriture féminine is: an essen-
tialist idea for which only those endowed with a female body have the
potential; a socially determined idea whereby femininity is a recon-
structed psychical positioning open to all; both at once.
It seems, then, puzzling that from a desire to ‘inscribe difference at the
heart of the universal’ (Kristeva, cited in Guberman, 1996: 269), French
feminists are regularly accused of essentialism. This is especially true of
Kristeva, whose attachment to the oedipal model has alarmed feminists,
raised suspicion as to her motivations and provoked virulent responses to
her message. Her strategy is always to rehabilitate the shattered subject of
the ‘crumbling social contract’ (Kristeva, 1974: 224) through the ‘search for
[its] legitimisation through the paternal function’ (Kristeva, 1974: 224).
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Does this entail the betrayal of the feminist cause? For the legitimization
of the social subject necessarily means the repression of the feminine.
Kristeva has defended herself, accusing Anglo-American feminist theo-
rists in particular of perpetrating ‘unconsciously the very oppositions
they are trying to undo’ (Kristeva, cited in Guberman, 1996: 107):
I believe that much of what has been written in the United States about my
conception has been inaccurate. People have either defined and glorified the
‘semiotic’ as if it were a female essence or else claimed that I do not grant
enough autonomy to this ‘essence’, this ‘difference’. I hear in such reductive
statements traces of the age-old debate between ‘universalists’ and the
‘differentialists’. (Kristeva, cited in Guberman, 1996: 269)
The attack on liberal (universalist) and radical (differentialist) feminists
is explicit and understandable. The trapping of Kristevan thought into an
either/or dialectic makes it difficult to rescue the Kristevan project, unless
we reconsider it from the perspective suggested by Cixous of difference
before exclusion. We find it explicitly in Kristeva also, under the guise of
the ‘maternal function’ or the ‘woman effect’:
. . . it entails a specific relationship to both power and language or, if you
will, to the power of language. This particular relationship is based not on
appropriating power and language, but on being a source of silent sup-
port, a useful backdrop, and an invisible intermediary. (Kristeva, cited in
Guberman, 1996: 104)
Silent, supportive, useful, invisible, in-between . . . This is hardly a glo-
rifying image of women’s social role. But Kristeva is not simply talking
about biological women. ‘Maternal’ and ‘woman’ refer, as in Cixous, to a
time anterior to paternal castration, a moment when antinomic worlds
can coexist without shattering one another. This is an experience the
future subject internalizes and of which the presence will make itself felt
in a certain type of expression: poiesis, écriture féminine, etc. What hinders
the assimilation of such terminology is the confusion between two regis-
ters pertaining to two experiences: that of the presocietal and that of social
organization. The capture of ‘maternal’ or ‘feminine’ in and as the body of
woman is a ‘symbolic effect of the way the subject experiences social cohe-
siveness, power and language’ (Kristeva, cited in Guberman, 1996: 104). It
is the way society requires we organize ourselves as social members. For
the French feminist, destroying the patriarchal markers of such a passage
from presocial to social does not fundamentally change the problem. We
may choose to discard the lipstick or cultivate a revolutionary Greenham
Common style image for ‘woman’, this still points to a symbolic evocation
of ‘woman’. The Anglo-American feminists’ frustration with French fem-
inism can also be located here. If French feminists succeed in demolishing
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all social action by reducing it to a ‘symbolic effect’ of something other,
what is the alternative? Does the ‘interiorisation of the founding separation
of the sociosymbolic contract’ (Kristeva, cited in Belsey and Moore, 1990:
215) offer feminism any hope?
My initial argument that the (mis)understanding of ‘French feminism’
is a translation issue has, then, slipped sideways. French thought is now
an obstruction to capturing the picture. French feminists are in the habit
of holding antithetic propositions under one thesis. This does not easily
pass the translation barrier from the French to the English language.
Translators of French feminist texts are time and time again faced with the
difficult task of rendering the French feminist spirit: ‘we have not made
the effort to create a seamless, smooth American English text’, one trans-
lator comments (Cixous, 1994: xxvi). Instead, the translator seeks ‘to make
the familiar uncanny’ (evoking the Freudian Unheimlich [Freud, 2003]),
‘the translation ought to aim at this sort of dépaysement’ (Cixous, 1994:
xxvi). Anne-Marie Smith (1998) and John Lechte (1991) have suggested
that the difficult passage from French into English may be more of a cul-
tural difficulty, indeed a dépaysement, than an actual translation barrier.
Smith proposes that Anglo-American thought demands of theory that
it be testable:
Freud is certainly in a more comfortable position in France than in Britain
or the United States, where in the wake of the recent vituperative indict-
ment of Freud, written by the American intellectual Frederick Crews, the
national, liberal press has entered into a trend which, setting psychoanaly-
sis against the demands of empiricism, attempts to disprove its theories as
non-scientific. The French Lacanian tradition reads Freud as a study of
language. (Smith, 1998: 8)
The main difference between French and Anglo-American intellectual
cultures comes down to a difference in the way the Freudian message has
been received. Smith’s packaging of Anglo-American psychoanalytic
thought is in itself questionable in the light of the diversity of readings
(I am thinking of the distinguished post-Kleinian British School of Object
Relation Theory). John Lechte overcomes this when he observes that the
cultural difference is not so much a French vs Anglo-American conflict
but the stumbling upon a limitation in rational thought:
The limit of phenomenological research is that it always, and inevitably,
refers back to an ultimate unity, a posited subject of experience, a Cartesian
subject in fact which is already an ‘I’, already the result of the distinction
between subject and object. (Lechte, 1991: 134)
The divide pitches established frameworks of thought of a Cartesian per-
suasion against conceptions of the subject that exceed such frameworks.
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Although such persuasion partakes in the historical making that defines
contemporary western thought, it certainly cannot be traced back to an
Anglo-American cultural tradition. Rather, reading through Lechte, we
are dealing with a historical clash of cultures pitching proponents of the
modernist project against the less peremptory discourses of late and post-
modernism. In this sense, the issue is not that Anglo-American theorists
read Freud differently from French feminists but that they read Freud and
French feminism with the same suspicion for their lack of a solid objective
base. As Smith notes:
. . . there is an aspect of French cultural life in general which involves
unabashed avowals of desire and seduction and distinct forms of identifi-
cation which a puritanical streak in Anglo-American culture resists as nar-
cissistic or uncritical and needs to turn into either abstractions or plain
speech. (Smith, 1998: 8)
French feminism reiterates after Freud a message of estrangement from
the motherland. This space of estrangement, of dépaysement then, is in fact
what French feminists constantly flirt with and what Anglo-American
culture defends itself against:
There is a staging of sensory pleasure which is not always considered polit-
ically correct, or critical, across the Channel or the Atlantic. This is a form of
resistance which goes far beyond distinguishing the package from the prod-
uct and in the name of critique translates itself as a refusal of seduction, and
an obsessional defence against hysteria of foreignness and femininity. This
sort of defensiveness is of course at the basis of any serious critical work but
it is also a measure of cultural difference which is played out, I would argue,
in relation to the question of seduction and resistance, just as xenophobia
and misogyny are extreme examples of defences against the lure of foreign-
ness or femininity. (Smith, 1998: 9)
Smith’s statement clearly proposes a dualistic relationship between the
two poles of feminist criticism, divided by a political or geographical bar-
rier. Interestingly, her choice of geographical divide, the sea or ocean, fits
the purpose of her message that it is something along the lines of the mater-
nal, hysteria, foreignness, femininity, that separates the two. That this
should be played out as a xenophobic singling-out of French feminism
would entail, if we follow her lead, Anglo-American feminists’ defence
against the maternal, the feminine, etc. In other words, American critics
would have invented ‘French feminism’ to express ideas unpalatable for
American domestic consumption under the cover of ‘foreign theory’.
If we go along with this, it would mean that Anglo-American feminists
have become the oppressors, French feminists the oppressed. Are we then
witnessing a repeat of feminist history with the old dialectic impossibility
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of accommodating difference within dominant discourse? All the ingre-
dients are certainly here: the demands that discourses of difference (French
feminism) be brought into line to comply with acceptable feminist dis-
course (Anglo-American feminism); the complaint from French feminists
that Anglo-American feminists do not understand and oppress them; etc.
But while their respective narratives reveal a clash in methods and objec-
tives, there are also crucial concessions granted theoretically on both sides.
For psychoanalytically oriented French feminism, differentiation will
be played out. Whether in sexism, racism, ageism, sexual orientation or
any other group, the existence of exclusion remains. The erasure or mod-
ification of categories such as sex, race, age does not fundamentally change
the outcome of exclusion, only the form it takes. Similarly, the suspension
of the differentiation theory will not suspend difference and by extension
exclusion, sexual or otherwise. If exclusion is not permitted in one area, it
will simply displace onto another. It is a small leap for French feminists to
concede that differentiation will also be played out in feminism, that the
fabrication of difference and of exclusion will occur no matter the good-
will of (Anglo-American) discourse.
In the view of the mounting Anglo-American interest in the French
feminist approach, especially with regards to their explanation of the psy-
chical dynamics of exclusion that animate every individual (Cavallaro,
2003), the construction of Anglo-American feminism as the adversary of
French feminism is not tenable. It is precisely their interest, which has
permitted the dissemination of French feminist ideas beyond the circles
of the Parisian elite. But if Anglo-American interest is not malevolent, it
is not benevolent or gratuitous either. Spivak (1981) has shown that inter-
est in the ‘other’ is rarely for the other’s benefit but more egotistically to
gain a better understanding of oneself. She says, ‘in spite of their occa-
sional interest in touching the other of the West, of metaphysics, of capi-
talism, their repeated question is obsessively self-centred: if we are not
what official history and philosophy say we are, who then are we (not),
how are we (not)?’ (Spivak, 1981: 158–9). As post-structuralist theory has
questioned the self-reflexive complacency of western history and philos-
ophy, categories they sought to explain have also been questioned. The
subject, capitalist social organization, etc. are being revisited, defended
or vilified. But Spivak finds that this questioning remains a self-reflexive
exercise rather than opening a dialogue with the other. The other’s vision
‘others me’, voices the negative spaces of my being. So the discourse of
the other provides me with a fuller picture of the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’
of my invisible being. If we apply Spivak’s idea to the Anglo-
American/French debate, what interests Anglo-American critics, when it
does not fascinate and anger them, is the space where French feminists
deny Anglo-Americans an existence. Hence, one of the major appeals of
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and objections to French feminism is the manner in which it supports
theories of difference and cherishes issues of otherness at the risk of ideal-
izing the notion of ‘Other’. For if the notional other loses its grounding in
any given sociopolitical reality, which ‘other’ is being lost? The Anglo-
American objection to the creation of a utopian universalized Other
would be an objection to being assimilated, as the other of French theory,
to a theoretical construct lacking specificity and roots in social reality.
French feminism would be inviting the dominant discourse to address
issues of its own dissolution.
To conclude, it may not be that Anglo-American feminists created
French feminism and then used it to voice, under the cover of ‘foreign the-
ory’, concerns impertinent to the dominant Anglo-American discourse.
But, it may well be that some Anglo-American feminists, who after a long
battle had earned social, political and academic credence, suddenly found
their secure base vulnerable to theories of difference. Then, we would be
justified in thinking that the so-called dialogue that has opened between
the two types of feminisms remains for many Anglo-American theorists
a tool for self-study rather than an opportunity to address the notion of
otherness. I would, however, propose to question this dreary conclusion
and finish on a more positive note.
French and Anglo-American feminisms cannot be reduced to geographi-
cal, cultural or linguistic denotations. In effect, I hope to have demonstrated
that they cannot be identified in isolation. From a political viewpoint, it
seems that both sides are engaged in a power play at who-will-dissolve-the-
other. French feminism is inviting Anglo-American feminists to revisit their
comfortable position and Anglo-American feminism is teasing clarification
out of French feminists’ seductive linguistic enigmas. This article has
mostly emphasized the unsettling effect French feminism has on Anglo-
American feminism, or rather the manner in which French feminism is con-
strued as that which upsets the Anglo-American feminist edifice. The
reverse could also have been argued. By placing itself as the other of other-
ness, Anglo-American feminism is positing itself as guardian of the symbol,
be it a feminist symbol – a somewhat ironic outcome. It would be equally
interesting to analyse how much Anglo-American feminism has reinforced
the inclination of French feminist discourse towards incarnating the dis-
course of otherness. By isolating and assuming the existence of French fem-
inist discourse, by adopting a sanctioning tone – feminist discourse must
have a clear political agenda, must not be essentialist, etc. – Anglo-
American feminism has, undoubtedly, ignited and fuelled a debate. A less
prohibitive and more inclusive analysis would conclude that the constant
crossing of the divide that separates these two particular poles of feminist
criticism has revived western feminism, offering fertile exchanges and
novel conceptions of subjectivity and gender.
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NOTES
My thanks go to Jennie Finch for her help.
1. In Fendler and Wittlinger (1999).
2. I am thinking about Kate Millett’s seminal text Sexual Politics (specifically
‘Freud and the Influence of Psychoanalytic Thought’ and ‘Some Post-
Freudians’), which fiercely exposed the sexism of the Freudian edifice
(Millett, 1977). Although Millett was not the only one to denounce Freud,
her work stands as representative of that which prompted a wave of discon-
tent that would typify radical feminism in particular. But separatism was not
the only effect this consciousness raising had. Other feminists chose to revise
the Freudian account (Juliet Mitchell, Jaqueline Rose, Sarah Kofman and
Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, for instance), thus creating the third wave of the
feminist struggle.
3. ‘Salmacis and Hermaphroditus’ in Ovid’s (1968) Metamorphoses.
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